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Abstract 
Access to credit remains a farfetched goal to the vast majority of Kenyans.  Kenya’s National FinAccess 
Survey, 2009 revealed that 60.4% of Kenya’s adult population is totally excluded from the credit market 
despite concerted government efforts to deepen access. This however marks a slight improvement from the 
63.4% figure recorded in 2006. Using multinomial probit models, the study drew a comparative analysis of 
the role played by individual characteristics on access to credit from various strands in 2006 and 2009. 
Results indicate that increase in household size reduced access to bank loans and ASCAs while it promoted 
access to loans from buyers of harvest. Increase in distance to service provider led to a decline in access to 
credit even though the impact was marginal. On the other hand, increase in age; education and income tend 
to enhance access to credit but the probability of access drops as one draws close to retirement age. The 
study recommends that measures geared towards reduction of information asymmetry like assessing the 
household characteristics, increased sharing of information, increased income need to be enhanced to help 
deepen access to credit.   
 
Keywords: Financial access; Financial exclusion 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A key policy concern in Kenya is that financial institutions are not providing enough credit to new 
economic activities, and in particular, the expansion of small and micro enterprises (SMEs).  Recent 
financial access surveys show that access to credit is a major problem especially in the rural areas (FSD 
2006 and FSD and Central Bank, 2009).  Specifically, the 2009 survey shows that 50 percent of the rural 
individuals had never used any credit service compared to 61.7 percent in 2006.    
 
According to Sacerdoti(2005), among the reasons for lack of access to credit from banks in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are inability of borrowers to provide accurate information on their financial status, absence of 
reliable and updated company and land registries, weak claim recovery and collateral realisation process 
such as malfunctioning courts and cumbersome legal and judicial procedures.   Other reasons include, long 
physical distance to the nearest financial services provider, high cost of the credit, socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics that make them less creditworthy
1
.    
 
There are a number of other alternatives to bank credit.  First is Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), which 
have an advantage over traditional banks and largely favour Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) which may 
be unable to meet conventional bank criteria such as producing formal financial statements. Instead, MFIs 
depend on cash-flow based lending, credit scoring, prior lending experience with the client, and group 
lending which gives them a competitive edge over banks.   However, the main challenges to MFIs are lack 
of credit lines, medium-term and long-term financing from banks or other sources as well as high cost of 
their credit to potential borrowers.   Second, is Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) which 
depends on the amount of mobilised savings and deposits to extend loans to members. Other credit sources 
include; Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs or chamas), Government, Employer, 
Informal lenders, Buyers of Harvest, Local shops and family/friends.   
 
The practise of credit rationing by financial institutions using interest rates has locked out most poor 
individuals as only large scale borrowers who expect higher returns can bear the high cost of borrowing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Due to the potential for adverse selection resulting from information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers, lenders are often discouraged from using the interest rate as a way to ration 
credit. Most rural individuals particularly rely on informal credit facility from buyers and sellers of 
consumer goods like shops and farmers. However, where there is no full information about the level of risk 
and credit worthiness of the individual, access to credit facility from both formal and informal lenders is 
constrained. The establishment and launch of the credit reference bureaus is expected to change the credit 
landscape since information on the credit worthiness is to be made available hence reducing the degree of 
information asymmetry. However, launch of this body does not suffice since information on most potential 
borrowers and first timers remain unknown. An understanding of the individual demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics and the level of access to credit could help in filling the knowledge gap on 
why most people remain financially excluded and how access can be deepened. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Banks and other credit suppliers use the following in credit assessment: Character of the borrower(C), 
Amount to be borrowed (A), Margin (M) or profit from lending, Purpose(P) of the loan, Ability(A) to 
repay, Repayment Amounts (R), Insurance (I) for the loan or security.  This is referred to as CAMPARI 
framework in commercial banking parlance. 
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To analyze this problem, a multinomial probit framework is used on both the 2006 and 2009 FinAccess 
National Survey data.  The results show that income, gender (1 is male and 2 female), marital status, and 
higher education tend to have a direct positive relationship to credit access. Distance to service provider 
and household size has an inverse relationship with access to credit. The study recommends that credit 
reference bureaus needs to be strengthened to facilitate more sharing of information about potential 
borrowers. Besides, the government should ensure there is increased productivity given the critical role 
played by income in raising access to credit. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 discusses the literature review, Section 3 gives the 
empirical framework and data analysis while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 gives the 
conclusions and policy recommendations for the study. 
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2.  LITERATURE  
Although theories such as pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1977), theory of perfect capital markets 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958), shape the functioning of capital markets, most of the reviewed literature 
hugely supports the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) in explaining the functioning of credit 
markets. This model assumes the presence of perfect capital markets. Besides, it assumes that economic 
and political institutions do not matter, even though they determine the structure and costs of human 
interaction. On the contrary developing countries, especially low-income countries, are characterized by 
institutional rigidities in the capital markets that deny the sustainability of the neo-classical assumptions of 
well functioning markets, perfect competition and mobility of factors of production. With institutions 
playing a critical role in determining the performance of economies, it is perhaps no surprise that credit 
channel plays a critical role as safety nets to cushion the poor against income loss or transitory changes in 
income as well as counter situations where the state is too weak to implement effective market policies.  
Developing countries are also characterized by ubiquitous information asymmetry and weak mechanisms in 
the financial markets to enforce formal contracts forcing them to look for alternatives in the informal sector 
which act as risk sharing mechanisms (Cox and Fafchamps, 2007). Given this fact, individuals are highly 
likely to receive loans from close relatives such as parents, spouses, and children among other informal 
lenders as opposed to the organized formal strands. Contrary to expectations of permanent income 
hypothesis where only permanent changes in income affect consumption, transitory changes in income 
have been found to impact on the consumption pattern (Campbel and Mankiw, 1989).  
While two major approaches have been put forward to guide empirical work on access to credit; the direct 
method by Japelli (1990) appears to be more robust. This method was used to counter the shortcomings of 
the indirect method where uncertainty among other factors was observed as leading to precautionary 
behaviour among households which ultimately led to changes in the consumption behaviour due to 
transitory changes in income even in the absence of credit constraints. 
 
Empirical studies indicate that increase in income raises access to credit. This was supported by Johnson 
and Morduch (2007), Diagne (1999), Bhuiya et al (2001) and Marge Sults (2003). People with more wealth 
captured in terms of household assets, size of land and number of livestock are found to have greater access 
to credit. Rassmussen et al (2005) puts it rightly by his argument that poverty is indeed a credit constraining 
factor. Bali Swain (2002) shares similar sentiments through his findings that more resource endowment 
enhances access to credit. Age and education appeared to play greater role in the informal credit markets.  
Zeller (1994) established that highly educated persons preferred loans from informal markets than formal 
ones. In general, more educated persons were less constrained according to Marge Sults (2003). In terms of 
age, the study argued that persons falling between 26-35 years were more constrained than those less than 
26 years of age. The study further argued that big families were less constrained. 
 
Other determinants cited included gender where Mayada et al (1994) claimed that women are especially 
discriminated against in formal financial markets. However, according to Zeller (1994), gender appeared to 
have no impact. Navajas and Tejerina (2006) cited high service cost as a major constraint.   
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Table 1: Expected Effects from theory  
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Explanation 
Income Proxied using expenditure/main 
economic activity that earns 
income; 
Positive  Transitory changes in income 
affect consumption (Campbel and 
Mankiw, 1989) 
Age Age of respondents in years Positive Access at intermediate age is 
higher (Zeller, 1994) 
Level of 
Education 
This is captured using highest 
education level attained 
Positive The higher the education , the 
higher the demand (Zeller, 1994) 
Gender 1-Male (Reference dummy); 2-
female 
Negative for 
women 
Women are discriminated against 
(Mayada et al, 1994) 
Age_Gender Random selection of age category 
and gender 
Positive Likely to be positive for 
intermediate aged males (Zeller, 
1994; Mayada, 1994) 
Marital Status 1-Single (reference dummy); 2-
Divorced; 3-Widowed; 4-
Married/living with Partner 
Positive  Based on the household 
constitution 
Household 
Size 
Number of family members in 
household 
Positive More labour available in a 
household improves family 
business (Marge Sults, 2003) 
Distance from 
Credit Source 
Captured using duration to the 
nearest financial service provider 
Negative Despite being close to credit 
source, households were still 
rationed (Johnson and Morduch, 
2007) 
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3.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The current study adopts a direct approach as used by (Jappelli, 1990 and Marge Sults, 2003) where data on 
the credit status of households has been collected. This approach focuses on those who applied and 
received credit, those who applied and were denied and those who never applied for credit. While both 
studies explored those with access and the credit constrained, the current study seeks to extend this study 
by distinguishing the level of access with respect to formal and informal institutions. This is besides 
capturing the impact of the interaction between age and gender. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
This study is motivated by McFadden’s random utility model (RUM). An individual is faced with various 
credit alternatives. The utility function can be written as;  
    MjNixVzxU jijjijijij ,...2,1,,...,2,1,;;        (1) 
Where;
 
 
jijijij
zxU ; represents the utility derived by individual i, from credit choice of alternative j 
ijx  represents the observed characteristics of individual i and alternative j chosen 
ijz  represents the unobserved characteristics of individual i and alternative j chosen 
 ;ijj xV  denotes the deterministic component of the utility 
j is the random component of the utility 
 
There are 11 alternatives, j; 
Formal: loans from banks. 
Formal other: Loans from Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs), government institution, 
and Hire Purchase. 
Informal: Loan from employer, Accumulative Savings and Credit Associations (ASCA’s)2, Informal 
lenders, Buyers of harvest and loans from Shops/suppliers 
Excluded: This comprises of loans from family/friends. They are considered as excluded since even 
informal groups require some sort of organizational structure with some common overriding purpose.  
 
Different multinomial models can be used by making different assumptions about the joint distribution of 
the error terms.   The assumption that the error terms are independent across alternatives would lead to the 
unordered multinomial logit (MNL) and conditional logit(CL) models.  Although this assumption has the 
advantage that the likelihood function is easy to compute, but it leads to very unrealistic predictions e.g. 
                                                 
 
2
 Commonly referred to in Kenya as Chamas  i.e.swahili name for groups 
212 
 
adding another alternative does not change the choices individuals make, which is the classic case of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) or the red bus-blue bus problem.   
 
The nested logit relaxes the IIA assumption by grouping the errors with independence across the credit 
alternatives but correlation permitted within groups.  The nested logit require existence of a clear nesting 
structure. The challenge in our case is that the existing survey data does not have alternative-varying 
regressors.    
 
The alternative model that is used in the study is the multinomial probit (MNP).  This approach introduces 
correlation across choices by assuming that the errors are jointly normally distributed with covariance 
matrix , which is not restricted to be a diagonal matrix. 
 
  ,0MND , with  MI  and         (2)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where  is a kronecker product, M is the number of alternatives 
 
3.2 Data type and sources 
The analysis is based on Financial Access, 2009 and 2006 survey data, collected by the Financial Sector 
Deepening (FSD) Kenya, in collaboration with the Central Bank of Kenya and the Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics (KNBS). FSD Kenya is an organization founded in 2005 with an aim of accelerating growth of 
the financial markets to stimulate wealth creation and poverty reduction by low income households and 
small enterprises.  
 
The study targeted 6,343 (2009) and 4214 (2006) respondents who were above 18 years which is the 
current legal age for obtaining a national identity (ID) card in Kenya. Those below 16 years were not 
investigated since they are not considered to be mature enough to make independent decisions as to where 
to seek credit services. 
 
The households were selected randomly throughout the country based on the rural and urban clusters. 
Respondents were later selected from those households to give their response on various financial matters.  
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4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Appendix Table A1 presents change in predicted probabilities on access to loans from selected sources for 
years 2006 and 2009 while figure 1 below represents a comparative analysis of the access strands in 2006 
and 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Comparative analysis of 2006 and 2009 Access to Credit from Various Strands 
The figure indicates that there was a marginal increase in access to credit in 2009 (39.62%) up from 
36.58% in 2006. Access to credit was distributed among the four strands in 2009 as follows; formal 
(7.12%), formal other (7.72%), informal (68.84%) and excluded (16.32%). The trend shows that there was 
a 1.67% increase in access to credit in 2009 from the formal strands where banks fall as compared to 2006. 
The average age of respondents with access to loans rose from 37.21 in 2006 to 39.21 in 2009 an indication 
that the probability of accessing loans increases with age.  
 
4.2 Econometric Analysis 
Since discrete choice models rely heavily on marginal effects, this section focused on the predicted 
probabilities of various alternatives as analysed using multinomial probit technique.  
4.2.1 Changes in Probability  
This technique sought to establish the linkage between socioeconomic and demographic variables for 
selected individuals and their choice of credit source. 11 alternative sources of credit were evaluated to 
establish the factors driving individual preferences for each alternative. This is presented in the Appendix 
(Table A1). Table A2 shows that the probability of accessing loans from the formal (Banks being the 
highest gainer) and formal other strand improved in aggregate terms (1.5 per cent and 1.4 per cent, 
respectively) implying that, most formal institutions are now becoming more aggressive in promoting their 
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loan facilities while at the same time trying to make them most attractive for potential borrowers. 
Previously, banks only targeted customers visiting the branch to apply for loans. Given the level of 
competition in the banking industry, banks have been forced to invest heavily in marketing their products 
and this initiative appears to be bearing fruit. The probability of obtaining a loan from a bank increased by 
1.52 per cent in 2009 with a similar trend being observed for SACCOs and MFIs whose probabilities 
increased by 1.21 per cent and 1.4 per cent, respectively.  
 
Despite Government and Hire Purchase loans falling in the formal other strand, the probability of accessing 
loans from theses alternatives reduced by 0.2 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. This could be explained 
by the rising default cases especially in the case of Higher Education Loans which limits the amount of 
funds available for advancement to other needy cases. Hire Purchase also faces similar challenges and can 
be explained by the rising auctioning of property from the defaulters. The informal strand has been on a 
loosing trail given that the probability of borrowing declined for all the alternatives 5.8 per cent in 
aggregate.  
 
Local shops/supplier lost with the highest margin 3.2 per cent despite its wide popularity in the rural areas 
followed by ASCAs (1.5 per cent). Similar declines in probabilities were observed for loans from informal 
money lenders, buyers of harvest and employers. Loans from this strand are usually grounded on mutual 
trust and goodwill.  While social capital may be the greatest endowment by the rural populace, failure to 
tap it will continue to deprive them from accessing loan facilities from both the formal and informal 
strands. 
 
Table A2 Change in Probabilities of Accessing Loans in 2009 and 2006 
 Credit Strand Predicted Probabilities 
 
    2009      2006    Difference 
Formal strand 
Bank     0.03177045 0.01653999       0.01523 
Formal Other Strand 
SACCO    0.03305839 0.02096975        0.012089 
MFI    0.02454787 0.01050907        0.014039 
Government    0.00166945 0.00386978       (0.0022) 
Hire purchase    0.00005091 0.01011519       (0.01006) 
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Informal Strand 
Informal Lender    0.00537951 0.00704183       (0.00166) 
ASCA    0.03468041 0.01921676        0.015464 
Buyer of harvest    0.01503235 0.01737726        (0.00234) 
Employer    0.00559312 0.01135729        (0.00576) 
Local shop/supplier    0.66618853 0.69866491        (0.03248) 
 
4.2.2 Marginal Effects from MNP Model  
Household size 
The results in Table A1 show that household size significantly explains access to credit from the buyer of 
harvest only in both 2006 and 2009.  In the 2009 survey an increase in household size by one person 
increases the probability of accessing loan from buyer of harvest by 0.2 per cent.  This makes sense since a 
large family is quite important in the production of agricultural produce.  However, the results for 2006 
survey paint a different picture- household size reduces access to credit from the buyer of harvest.  
 
 Age 
In the 2006 survey age has a positive statistically significant relationship with access to credit from banks 
and SACCOS as expected?  However, it has a negative relationship with loans from government.  The 
rather unexpected results can be rationalised by the fact that the loans from government are mainly from the 
High Education Loans Board (HELB), which mainly target young people just joining universities. In the 
2009 survey age has a positive statistically significant relationship with credit from banks, SACCOs, MFI 
and ASCAS.  However, age reduces the probability of accessing credit from a local shop/supplier.   
 
In both 2006 and 2009, there is a quadratic relationship between access to credit and age.    There are two 
trends noted.  First, for banks, MFIs and ASCAs, increase in age raises the probability to access credit but 
after some age the probability declines.   This can be rationalised by the fact that the CAMPARI framework 
used by banks automatically views very old applicants are less creditworthy.  Second, government loans in 
2006 and loans from local in 2009, there is a U-shaped relationship with age.  This means that at a very 
young age the probability of accessing credit declines upto some optimal age when the probability 
increases. 
 
Gender 
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In the 2006 survey, gender was a significant factor for SACCOs and ASCAs.  Specifically, SACCOs 
preferred lending to males compared to females.   Contrariwise the ASCAs preferred lending the women 
compared to men.  This makes sense given the fact that ASCAs which are otherwise known as ‘chamas’ 
mainly comprise of women making them the biggest beneficiaries.  
In the 2009 survey men had a higher probability of accessing credit facilities from banks, SACCOs and 
Employers compared to women. Contrariwise women had a higher chance of accessing credit facilities 
from MFIs and local shops.  This can be rationalised by the fact that MFIs in Kenya mainly target women 
groups.  Similarly, local shops mainly offer household goods on credit, which generally benefits women 
who manage household expenditure in most homes. Going by the 2006 and 2009 figures which depict a 
rising trend, there is a strong indication that females are becoming more actively involved in the credit 
markets.   
 
Level of education 
In the 2006 survey, increase in the number of schooling years was found to increase the probability of 
accessing loans from banks, SACCOs, MFIs, ASCAs and Employer.   However, the number of schooling 
years reduced the probability of accessing credit facilities from a local shop.   Specifically, as the number 
of schooling years increase by one year, the probability of accessing loans from the local shop declined by 
about 4.7 per cent.   
 
In the 2009 survey the situation did not change much- increase in the number of schooling years increased 
the probability of accessing loans from banks, SACCOs, government, and employer.  However, just like in 
2006 survey, the probability of accessing credit facilities from a local shop declined with increase in the 
number of schooling years.  
 
Marital status 
Except for loans from local shops, marital status is not a statistically significant variable in explaining 
access to loans. The results show that the probability of accessing loans from a local shop is higher for 
married people.  This can be rationalised by the fact that local shops lend on the basis of trust which to a 
certain extent will be higher for a married person since a married person is perceived to be responsible over 
his/her action and is therefore not likely to default in settling the debt. Married persons are also considered 
to be abit stable and would take longer to migrate to another place.  
 
Distance 
Distance is measured as the duration it takes to reach the nearest financial provider like a bank. While 
distance was quite significant in explaining access to loans for most alternatives in 2006, only the marginal 
effects for the employer and local shop loans were significant in 2009. Specifically, the probability of 
accessing credit facilities from a local shop increase with distance to the nearest financial services provider 
in both 2006 and 2009 surveys. There is therefore need to take steps to take credit services to the people, 
especially in the rural areas. 
 
Level of income 
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While income was not significant in explaining access to loans in 2006, the variable was found to be 
statistically significant in explaining loans from Banks, SACCOs and local shops. Increase in income was 
found to contribute positively on access to loans from both Banks and SACCOs while it reduced the 
probability of accessing loans from a local shop by 0.15% in 2009 up from 0.013% in 2006.  The negative 
relationship with credit from local shops can be explained by the fact that households with low income live 
hand to mouth and are likely to utilise credit from the local shop. 
 
4.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Findings from this study reveal that only 39.62% (up from 36.58% in 2006) of the total sampled population 
have access to credit in Kenya, for whom 5.82% and 33.80% accounts for formal and informal credit 
sources. The total adult population considered to be credit constrained (excluded) therefore stands at 
60.38%. Men continue to enjoy access to loans from banks as women seek alternatives like MFIs and other 
informal loans from ASCAs and local shops. The age of a person appear to have a quadratic relationship, 
with the middle aged persons having a higher access than the elderly persons. Similarly, highly educated 
persons have a higher access to credit from the formal strand and particularly Banks and SACCOs, while 
their participation in local shop loans is greatly reduced. Distance on the other hand served as a hindrance 
to accessing credit since most individuals were observed to prefer walking shorter distances to their 
financial service providers. However, the impact of distance was minimal, reducing access to bank loans 
marginally while at the same time increasing access to local shop loans with the same margin.  
 
4.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper focused on the socioeconomic and demographic factors that characterize access to credit in 
Kenya and particularly centred on the four credit strands namely the formal formal other, informal and the 
excluded category. The study established that despite the spirited campaigns stepped up by the government 
to deepen access to loans; majority remain financially excluded. This is attributed to lack of information 
about their individual characteristics which if known could help reduce the degree of information 
asymmetry. Disclosure of their individual characteristics could signal their credit worthiness and make 
them attractive to lending institutions. One initiative by the government through establishment of Credit 
Reference Bureaus (CRBs) will go a long way in lowering credit risks through improved sharing of 
borrower information. Towards this end, the government should ensure that CRBs are extended to all 
sectors including agriculture where most borrowers hail from.  
 
Agency banking which is now being used by various commercial banks to increase access to financial 
services should be extended further to increase proximity to financial service providers. Such initiatives 
will also help in lowering operating costs for the banks and this could help expand access to loan services. 
 
Given that of the total banked population, only 7.12% and 7.72% acquired loans from a formal and formal 
other strand respectively, there is need for further research to investigate why informal credit is more 
preferred to formal so that the formal institutions can borrow a leaf to increase their market share. The 
potential for informal lenders can be tapped further given their popularity among the rural populace.  An 
Act of Parliament should also be introduced to oversee and regulate the operations in the informal sector. 
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Economic empowerment of masses should be enhanced to increase the income levels. This can be 
enhanced through increased participation in the labour markets as a result of increased creation of jobs and 
self employment. This will help in raising income which could in turn be used as collateral when applying 
for loans. The government must therefore step in to ensure that more jobs are created and for the self 
employed, the government should ensure that raw materials are acquired at affordable prices besides 
creating markets for the finished goods. Since rural residents rely heavily on agricultural produce, the 
government should provide subsidies for the farm inputs and introduce high yielding and fast maturing 
crops so that the frequency of receiving earnings can be raised. Besides to mitigate against the adverse 
effects of drought, the government should sink boreholes and establish irrigation projects to ensure there is 
constant water flow for framing activities. 
 
Since education enhances access to credit, the government must ensure that free primary education and free 
secondary education is extended to tertiary levels since higher education makes people arrive at informed 
decisions about loans. The government should be ready to support the bright students who lack the ability 
to pay fees. This can be done by increasing the money allocated towards bursary funds. The various 
devolved funds should therefore be monitored to ensure that students benefit from the same. More tertiary 
institutions should also be established. In doing this, the government must ensure that courses under study 
are relevant and applicable outside the classes to promote self employment. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1: Multinomial Probit Results 
VARIABLE 2009     2006     
FORMAL CREDIT STRAND 
 BANK Marginal Effects 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
  
Variables 
Probability=  
0.03177045 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01654 z-stat Mean 
age   0.0049229*** 2.92 39.2067 0.0028279** 1.99 37.2073 
income    8.40e-07*** 5.73 19144.5 0.0000442 0.21 10.5538 
gender       -0.0149364**** -2.42 1.5682 0.0007796 0.14 1.54797 
education     0.0230425 *** 8.63 3.42317 0.0163973*** 5.01 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0007942 0.24 3.31635 0.0031188 1.18 3.30328 
Hhsize -0.0025225 -1.58 4.83895 0.0009735 0.48 2.54089 
distance   -0.0047556  -1.34 2.68159 -0.006269*** -4.04 4.28525 
agesq     -0.0000452 *** -2.37 1741.84 -0.0000219 -1.37 1577.78 
 FORMAL OTHER CREDIT STRAND 
SACCO 
Probability=  
0.03305839 
 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.02096975 z-stat Mean 
age   0.002252* 1.75 39.2067 0.0030557** 2.09 37.2073 
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income    2.79E-07** 2.09 19144.5 0.0003053 1.40 10.5538 
gender    -0.0212081*** -2.86 1.5682 -0.0143802** -2.08 1.54797 
education    0.0184774*** 7.09 3.42317 0.0088487*** 3.59 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0042691 1.10 3.31635 0.0057041 1.58 3.30328 
Hhsize -0.0008188 -0.50 4.83895 0.0003661 0.15 2.54089 
distance   -0.0027686 -0.75 2.68159 -0.010746*** -5.59 4.28525 
agesq    -3.24E-06 -0.25 1741.84 -0.0000225 -1.45 1577.78 
 
MFI 
Probability=  
0.02454787 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01050907 z-stat Mean 
age   0.0037732** 2.28 39.2067 0.0012973 1.11 37.2073 
income    2.54E-08 0.17 19144.5 0.0000938 0.52 10.5538 
gender    0.0238309*** 3.36 1.5682 0.0053842 1.06 1.54797 
education    0.0072871*** 3.08 3.42317 0.0009435 0.56 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0038699 1.11 3.31635 0.0003009 0.13 3.30328 
Hhsize 0.0016447 1.16 4.83895 0.0000783 0.04 2.54089 
distance   -0.0019826 -0.62 2.68159 -0.005993*** -4.42 4.28525 
agesq    -0.0000404** -2.08 1741.84 -0.0000145 -1.07 1577.78 
 GOVERNMEN
T 
INSTITUTION 
Probability=  
0.00166945 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.00386978 z-stat Mean 
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age   0.0003698 1.03 39.2067 -0.00113* -1.95 37.2073 
income    2.04E-08 0.88 19144.5 -2.86e-06 -0.03 10.5538 
gender    -0.0001059 -0.08 1.5682 0.0003178 0.14 1.54797 
education    0.0011368 1.50 3.42317 0.0050653*** 2.58 3.35093 
maritalstatus     -0.0012802 -1.43 3.31635 0.0006145 0.61 3.30328 
Hhsize 0.0002011 0.76 4.83895 0.0009776 1.16 2.54089 
distance   -0.0008311 -0.98 2.68159 -0.0011158 -1.68 4.28525 
agesq    -4.88e-06 -1.04 1741.84 0.0000131** 1.99 1577.78 
 HIRE 
PURCHASE 
Probability=  
0.00005091 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01011519 z-stat Mean 
age             4.15e-06 0.24 39.2067 0.0005405 0.32 37.2073 
income    1.37e-10 0.09 19144.5 -0.000034 -0.15 10.5538 
gender    -0.0000177 -0.18 1.5682 0.0001378 0.03 1.54797 
education    0.0000683 0.46 3.42317 0.0017043 0.91 3.35093 
maritalstatus     -3.45e-06 -0.09 3.31635 -0.0008701 -0.42 3.30328 
hhsize -0.0000631 -0.51 4.83895 0.0017427 0.98 2.54089 
distance   -0.000038 -0.43 2.68159 -0.0015914 -1.24 4.28525 
agesq    1.88e-09 0.01 1741.84 -0.0000157 -0.71 1577.78 
 INFORMAL CREDIT STRAND 
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INFORMAL 
LENDER 
Probability=  
0.00537951 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.00704183 z-stat Mean 
age   0.0003675 0.66 39.2067 0.0001142 0.10 37.2073 
income    -7.44e-08 -0.60 19144.5 -0.0002581 -0.71 10.5538 
gender    -0.0002895 -0.09 1.5682 -0.00152 -0.34 1.54797 
education    0.0010165 0.88 3.42317 0.0004328 0.27 3.35093 
maritalstatus     -0.0022422 -1.59 3.31635 -0.0002013 -0.11 3.30328 
hhsize -0.0000351 -0.05 4.83895 -0.0036228* -1.70 2.54089 
distance   0.0007711 0.53 2.68159 -0.0010582 -0.99 4.28525 
agesq    -2.00e-06 -0.34 1741.84 -4.68e-06 -0.32 1577.78 
 
ASCA 
Probability=  
0.03468041 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01921676 z-stat Mean 
age   0.0045486*** 2.71 39.2067 0.0028422 1.64 37.2073 
income    9.12e-09 0.05 19144.5 -0.0001217 -0.40 10.5538 
gender    0.0288151*** 3.48 1.5682 0.0272258*** 3.54 1.54797 
education    0.0055543** 1.97 3.42317 0.0029996 1.21 3.35093 
maritalstatus     -0.0056704 -1.53 3.31635 0.0029507 0.80 3.30328 
hhsize -0.0030038 -1.62 4.83895 0.0040156 1.58 2.54089 
distance   -0.0040987 -1.02 2.68159 -0.004689*** -2.82 4.28525 
agesq    -0.0000416** -2.24 1741.84 -0.000033 -1.61 1577.78 
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 BUYER OF 
HARVEST 
Probability=  
0.01503235 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01737726 z-stat Mean 
age   -0.0001549 -0.15 39.2067 -0.0010621 -0.85 37.2073 
income    -2.86e-07 -1.24 19144.5 -0.000805 -1.32 10.5538 
gender    -0.0046139 -0.88 1.5682 -0.0036163 -0.51 1.54797 
education    -0.0014515 -0.71 3.42317 0.0009457 0.36 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0029898 1.09 3.31635 0.0025668 0.76 3.30328 
hhsize 0.0023893** 2.20 4.83895 -0.006661** -2.16 2.54089 
distance   -0.0025854 -1.06 2.68159 0.0044017** 2.17 4.28525 
agesq    -3.07e-07 -0.03 1741.84 0.0000131 0.97 1577.78 
 
EMPLOYER 
Probability=  
0.00559312 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.01135729 z-stat Mean 
age   0.0011733 1.44 39.2067 0.0006242 0.38 37.2073 
income    5.62e-08 1.15 19144.5 -0.0000104 -0.04 10.5538 
gender    -0.0051966* -1.75 1.5682 -0.0063619 -1.13 1.54797 
education    0.0018928* 1.74 3.42317 0.0037843** 1.88 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0016287 1.21 3.31635 0.0013455 0.52 3.30328 
hhsize -0.0006786 -1.00 4.83895 -0.0006036 -0.27 2.54089 
distance   -0.003632** -2.10 2.68159 -0.001588 -1.23 4.28525 
agesq    -0.0000169 -1.65 1741.84 -0.0000116 -0.55 1577.78 
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 LOCAL 
SHOP/SUPPLI
ER 
Probability=  
0.66618853 z-stat Mean 
Probability=  
0.69866491 z-stat Mean 
age   -0.0229682*** -5.93 39.2067 -0.0046889 -0.96 37.2073 
income    -1.48e-06*** -2.83 19144.5 -0.0001344 -0.13 10.5538 
gender    0.0691342*** 3.37 1.5682 0.0073154 0.30 1.54797 
education    -0.0397645*** -5.35 3.42317 -0.047375*** -5.38 3.35093 
maritalstatus     0.0188001** 1.93 3.31635 0.0004504 0.04 3.30328 
hhsize -0.0011009 -0.25 4.83895 0.0125103 1.39 2.54089 
distance   0.0355028*** 3.74 2.68159 0.0139117** 2.27 4.28525 
agesq    0.0002162*** 5.16 1741.84 0.00003 0.55 1577.78 
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